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two parties compelled the City to supply water to properties within
corporate limits, but vested discretion in the city council to designate
any areas it would serve beyond its borders. The court held that the
City not only had authority to designate the areas outside its borders,
but also had a financial incentive to deny new hookups after the
County withdrew from the revenue sharing agreement. The court
held that the City could use the utilities as a tool to manage growth
because its first obligation was to its own residents, who funded the
system. The court then reversed the trial court's judgment.
Lori Asher

Paterno v. California, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that: (1) the then-announced Locklin factors needed to be
retroactively applied on remand; (2) negligent maintenance in aid of a
public flood control project was insufficient to establish takings
liability; (3) evidence that the levee failure was caused by rapid failure
from hydrofracture and that such hydrofracture was not predictable
corroborated a finding that the defendants did not create a dangerous
condition of public property; and (4) the plaintiff did not establish
prejudice stemming from the dismissal of the nuisance claim as being
duplicative of the negligence claim).
Flooding in the Sacramento Valley is common. In February 1986,
a turbulent storm hit areas of California and remained for more than a
week. The Linda levee, located in Yuba County, was at issue in this
case. The state was ultimately responsible for the Linda levee;
however, the local district had control over the daily maintenance and
operation of the levee, subject to federal and state standards. The
state was required to inspect the levee twice a year. On February 20,
1986, Eddie Bolton rode his bike on the levee and noticed boils on the
landside. A boil occurs when water is piped from the riverside to the
landside of the levee. Some boils carry a soil and water mixture that
removes support from the levee. The boils at issue were of such a
character. He reported the boils that evening. Approximately forty
minutes after he reported the boils, the levee buckled. The present
case arose from this collapse, which resulted in extensive flooding and
property damage.
Paterno alleged that all of the following contributed to the
Linda levee's failure: rodent burrows, boils, a forgotten concrete pipe,
and a nearby gravel pit that perforated the subsurface layers and
permitted water to flow underneath the levee. Paterno brought suit
alleging that the state inadequately maintained, inspected, and
operated the levee.
An owner may sue for inverse condemnation, when the
government takes or damages property without first paying for the
right to do so. Generally, strict liability applies when the government
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takes or damages property. However, strict liability is not applicable
when the project fails and causes damage to properties historically
subject to flooding. A reasonableness standard then must be used. To
establish strict liability, Paterno had to establish: (1) the identification
of maintenance plan(s); (2) the state in fact adopted such plans; and
(3) the plans contributorily caused the floods.
When a public flood control system fails to safeguard land from
historic periodic flooding, it must be determined whether the system
design posed an unreasonable risk of harm. The Locklin factors are
used to reach such a conclusion and are: (1) the overall purpose
served by the project; (2) to what extent losses are offset by reciprocal
benefits provided by the project; (3) the availability of alternatives to
the plan adopted; (4) the severity of the plaintiffs damage in relation
to risk-bearing capabilities; (5) the extent to which the damage is a
normal risk of land ownership; and (6) the degree to which the
damage is distributed at large over the project or is peculiar to the
plaintiff. The Locklin factors apply retroactively.
If the Locklin factors demonstrate that the system plan posed an
unreasonable risk of harm, then a takings liability is feasible if a
negligent plan of maintenance exists. The plan of maintenance must
be found to be unreasonable. The court had already held that takings
liability only transpires from a public entity's failure to appreciate
potential property harm, not from an employee's failure.
Here,
the
court addressed Paterno's
seven
different
unreasonableness arguments. First, the court asserted that it was not
unreasonable for the local reclamation districts to act as the
''permanent committee" responsible for maintaining the project in
accordance with federal law. Second, the court determined that the
State's failure to verify that the levee patrols were being done on a
regular basis was a negligence claim, so the court did not decide the
issue. Third, the court considered the allegation pertaining to the
unreasonable failure to have federally mandated continuous levee
patrols immaterial and irrelevant because of its negligence nature.
Fourth, the vegetation and rodent plans were shown as unreasonably
superficial in order to support takings liability. Fifth, the failure to
excavate encroachments could be perceived as unreasonable, if it
could be shown that the defendants knew or should have known about
the encroachments and did not inspect or remove any of them. Sixth,
the government did not act unreasonably in failing to upgrade the
levee. Lastly, the state's unreasonableness regarding its authorization
of the gravel pit could be established if Paterno could show that the pit
pierced an impermeable subsurface layer that channeled water,
resulting in the levee collapse.
Paterno asserted that the state maintained a dangerous condition
of public property. The court sustained the trial court's decree that
the defendants, in fact, did not preserve a dangerous condition of
public property. The court reasoned that if evidence existed alluding
to the rapid failure of the levee due to the existence of an
unpredictable hydrofracture, then a dangerous condition of public
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property was not present.
A nuisance claim emanates from the notion that anything that is
injurious to one's health or an obstruction to the free use and
comfortable enjoyment of life or property constitutes a nuisance. A
nuisance cause of action cannot substitute for a dangerous condition
of property cause of action in a situation when the cause of the
nuisance itself is a dangerous condition of property.
Paterno
effectively showed the trial court's error in granting defendant's
directed verdict, but nonetheless made minimal effort to show
prejudice derived from the directed verdict. Therefore, the court
found harmless error. The court reasoned that Paterno had the duty
of asserting a prejudice claim and arguing how the error equated to a
miscarriage ofjustice. The court ordered a new trial.
SaraFranklin

COLORADO
Eagle Peak Farms, Ltd. v. Lost Creek Ground Water Management
Dist., No. 98CA1518, 1999 WL 771014 (Colo. App. Sept. 30, 1999)
(holding that accomplishing personal service within thirty days is a
procedural requirement, the violation of which does not mandate
dismissal of an appeal).
Eagle Peak Farms ("Eagle Peak") filed an application for a change
of water rights with the Colorado Ground Water Commission and the
Lost Creek Ground Water Management District ("District"). After a
hearing, the District denied the application. Eagle Peak then filed a
notice of appeal in the district court. Eagle Peak failed, however, to
timely serve three of the twenty defendants and interested-party
defendants. Due to this failure, the district court dismissed the appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal and lack of
personal jurisdiction over the three defendants.
On appeal, Eagle Peak argued that although the filing of the
notice of appeal with the court was jurisdictional, once timely filed, the
appeal has been perfected even though all interested parties may not
have been served personally with such notice within thirty days. The
District, to the contrary, argued that notice of the appeal must be
served personally upon all parties within the thirty day time period or
the appeal must be dismissed for lack of subject matterjurisdiction.
In reviewing the appeal and the arguments set forth by both sides,
the court held that violation of a procedural requirement did not
mandate dismissal of the appeal. The court held that filing a timely
notice of appeal in the district court invoked subject matter
jurisdiction for the appeal; subject matter jurisdiction could not be
waived. On the other hand, procedural requirements were intended
to facilitate proceedings before the court. Once a court's subject

